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Abstract 
This article examines the importance of non-farm income in reducing per-capita income 
inequality among agricultural households in southern Ethiopia, with an emphasis on the 
gender dimension. Using a modified technique of inequality decomposition by income 
sources applied to household survey data, it was found that female non-farm labor income 
is the only income source that significantly reduces per-capita income inequality. More 
precisely, a uniform increase in female non-farm labor income, among households that 
already have income from this source, reduces inequality. Encouraging women to devote 
more time to non-farm income-generating activities, and creating market mechanisms that 
increase earnings in these activities, could potentially lift households out of poverty and at 
the same time reduce income inequality as a whole. The impact on inequality could be 
stronger if policies are directed at asset-poor households and less-educated households in 
particular. One of the policies that could be useful in this regard is female educational 
enhancements. This could open more opportunities for women in the hired labor market, 
improve women's position within the household, and promote overall income inequality as 
well as gender equality. 
 
Introduction 
Rural non-farm employment has long been recognized as a channel out of poverty. 
Many previous empirical studies found that non-farm income reduces poverty and 
inequality among farm households (see Kimhi, 2007, and references therein). In 
agricultural societies, considerable gender disparities in access to and utilization of non-
farm employment opportunities usually exist. This is due to both supply (push) and demand 
(pull) factors. On the supply side, gender specialization in both farm production and 
household activities dictate gender differences in both time constraints and the value of 
time. On the demand side, gender differences in market-oriented qualifications such as 
formal education dictate differences between the demand for male labor and the demand 
for female labor. Both supply and demand could also be subject to considerable gender 
discrimination in traditional societies. Most of these factors work against women. 
However, increasing women's position is known to be favorable not only to household 
income but also to child education, child mortality, and health and nutritional status of all 
household members (Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003; Schmeer, 2005; Kurosaki et al., 
2006; Park, 2007). 
In this paper, the gender dimension of non-farm employment is examined from 
another aspect of rural development, namely income inequality. It is not theoretically clear 
a-priori whether increasing non-farm employment opportunities for women relative to men 
increases or decreases income inequality. On one hand, women from disadvantaged 
households have stronger incentives to engage in non-agricultural activities, which could 
reduce inequality. On the other hand, there is abundant evidence that women with higher 
labor market qualifications tend to be married to men with higher qualifications, and these 
may benefit more from the increased opportunities, thereby increasing inequality (Burtless, 
1999). Existing empirical evidence suggests that higher women's income is associated with 
lower income inequality in many countries, including the U.S. (Cancian and Reed, 1998; 
Pencavel, 2006), the UK (Harkness, Machin, and Waldfogel, 1997; Davies and Joshi, 
1998), Israel (Gronau, 1982; Kimhi, 2008b), Sweden (Björkland, 1992), Italy (Del Boca 
and Pasqua, 2003), Japan (Abe and Oishi, 2007), and Malaysia (Amin and DaVanzo, 
2004). On the other hand, Aslaksen, Wennemo and Aaberge (2005) found evidence for the 
contrary in Norway.   3
We examine this issue in the context of a predominantly subsistence agricultural 
society in Southern Ethiopia, in which considerable gender differences exist in the tasks 
performed by men and women on the farm and in the household, in the tendency to engage 
in wage labor and in self-employment activities, and in the amounts earned from these 
activities, which are strongly biased in favor of men (Loening et al., 2008). Despite a 
relatively homogeneous production technology and an egalitarian institutional structure, 
considerable income inequality has been documented in rural Ethiopia (Jayne et al., 2003; 
van der Berg and Kumbi, 2006), and this inequality has been found to be related to the 
composition of income (kimhi, 2008a). In particular, it was found that self-employment 
income decreases inequality. None of the earlier studies has looked at the gender dimension 
of income inequality in rural Ethiopia. 
 The main objective of this paper is to quantify the extent to which an increase in 
female non-farm labor income affects per-capita income inequality among the sample 
households, and compare it with a similar increase in male non-farm labor income and 
other income sources. Inequality decomposition techniques are applied to household survey 
data, and in particular, the well-known technique of decomposing inequality by income 
sources (Shorrocks, 1982) is used. This technique decomposes a quantitative inequality 
measure into components, each related to a particular income source. In addition, the 
decomposition results are used to derive marginal effects of income sources on inequality. 
These marginal effects measure the impact on inequality of a uniform percentage increase 
of income from each source. We differentiate between intensive marginal effects, which 
are the effects of increasing income from each source for those households who already 
derive income from that source, and extensive marginal effects, which are the effects of 
increasing the number of households that derive income from each source. We also 
differentiate the marginal effects by population sub-groups, allowing for non-homogenous 
increases in income. We compare the results of two decomposition rules, one based on the 
Gini index of inequality and the other based on the squared coefficient of variation, to 
verify that they are robust to the choice of decomposition rule. 
In the next section we present the inequality decomposition techniques that are 
applied in this research. After that, we describe the surveyed population and the data used 
in this research. The following section presents the empirical results, and the final section 
concludes with some policy implications and suggestions for further research. 
 
Methodology: Inequality decomposition by income sources 
Consider an inequality index that can be written as a weighted sum of incomes: 
 
(1)  I(y) = Σiai(y)yi,  
 
where ai are the weights, yi is the income of household i, and y is the vector of household 
incomes. Many conventional inequality measures, including the Gini inequality index, the 
squared coefficient of variation, and Theil's T index can be specified as (1). Shorrocks 
(1982) showed that if income is observed as the sum of incomes from k different sources, 
yi=Σkyi









Dividing (2) by I(y), one obtains the proportional contribution of income source k to overall 






Choosing the inequality weights ai(y) may affect the decomposition results. Several 
authors, including Shorrocks (1983), Morduch and Sicular (2002), and Kimhi (2007), 
suggested not to rely solely on a single decomposition rule, but rather to compare the 
results of several different decomposition rules. When the inequality index (1) is the 






Shorrocks (1982) has shown that (4) is equal to the average of two quantities: the inequality 
that would be observed if y
k was the only source of inequality, and the amount by which 
inequality would fall if inequality in y
k was completely eliminated. Lerman and Yitzhaki 
(1985) and Podder and Chatterjee (2002) have shown that the proportional contribution of 
y
k to the Gini inequality index can be written as a product of its share in total income, the 
Gini correlation between y
k and y, and the Gini coefficient of y
k itself.  
The proportional contributions to inequality indicate, therefore, what would be the 
impact on inequality of an increase in the variability of each income source. A more policy-
relevant question is, perhaps, what would be the impact on inequality of a uniform increase 
in each particular income source. Shorrocks (1983) has noted that comparing s
k, the 
proportional contribution of income source k to inequality, and μ
k/μ, the income share of 
source k, is useful for knowing whether an increase in the k
th income source is equalizing or 
disequalizing. Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) and Podder and Chatterjee (2002) formalized 
this intuitive result for the case of the Gini inequality index, and showed that the relative 
change in the Gini index following a uniform percentage change in y
k is equal to (s
k-
μ
k/μ)G(y). Kimhi (2007) suggested using simulations to derive similar "marginal effects" 
for the case of alternative inequality measures. Note that the marginal effect of increasing 
income from a certain source by one percent uniformly is conditional on the subset of 
households that derive positive income from that source. Hence it will be denoted here as 
the intensive marginal effect. Alternatively, it is possible to simulate the effect on 
inequality of an increase in the fraction of households that derive income from each source, 
which is denoted here as the extensive marginal effect. This method is explained in the 
appendix. One can think of certain policy measures that affect income of those who already 
derive income from a certain source, and other policy measures that cause households to 
move into or out of this set of households. In certain cases, the intensive marginal effect 
can be thought of as a short-run effect, while the extensive marginal effect can be thought 
of as a long-run effect. 
 
Data 
    The data used in this research was collected through a household survey, which was 
conducted during January-March of 1995 in the Ejana-Wolene, one of the sub-districts of the 
Guragie administrative zone, in the Southern region of Ethiopia. Ensete (false banana) is the 
major crop and food source in the region, and is grown by most households on small plots 
around the house. Its stem, roots and leaves are used for food and fiber. The cultivation of 
Ensete is highly labor-intensive, with men responsible for transplanting and harvesting, and 
women responsible for further processing and preparation. A total of 583 households were 
surveyed, about 31 in each of 19 randomly-chosen peasant associations. The survey 
questionnaire included questions about personal and family characteristics, food production   5
and expenditures, income and assets, health, and time allocation. Figure 1 shows that almost a 
third of adult females in the sample households engage in non-agricultural activities, while 
only a fifth of males do so. However, men are more likely to engage in wage labor, while 
women are more likely to engage in self-employment activities, including handicrafts, trade 
and transport (by animals). Males and females spend roughly equal number of days per 
year in their non-agricultural activities, 82.5 days for males and 91 days for females). 
However, men who are engaged in non-farm activities have much higher incomes than 
women. Kimhi and Sosner (2000) reported that men earned 4.6 birr per day on average, 
while women earned 1.9 birr on average (the official exchange rate at the time of the 
survey was roughly 6 birr per $US). Men are also considerably more educated than women, 
which is consistent with the observed earning differentials (Kimhi, 2006). These gender 
differences are not unique to the surveyed population. Loening et al. (2008) report similar 
findings for other parts of rural Ethiopia. 
These figures provide the justification for differentiating between male non-farm 
labor income and female non-farm labor income in the empirical analysis. Unfortunately, 
other income sources could not be individualized. These are grouped together into two 
categories: agricultural income (including income from crops and from livestock) and 
remittances. Agricultural income consists of roughly 50% of household income, and the 
remaining half is split almost evenly between remittances and non-farm labor income 
(figure 2). About two thirds of non-farm labor income is contributed my men.  
 
Results 
    The inequality decomposition results (table 1) reveal that the rankings of the 
proportional contributions to inequality are similar to the rankings of the importance of the 
different income sources: agricultural income has the largest proportional contribution to 
inequality among all income sources, remittances are second in importance, then men's 
non-farm labor income, and women's non-farm labor income is responsible for the smallest 
fraction of income inequality, 4.2% under the Gini decomposition rule and 1.7% under the 
squared coefficient of variation (both fractions are significantly different from zero). As the 
proportion of inequality contributed by women's non-farm labor income (2%-4%) is lower 
than its income share (10%), a uniform increase in women's non-farm labor income is 
expected to decrease household income inequality. This is confirmed by the intensive 
marginal effects of women's non-farm labor income, which are negative and statistically 
significant under both decomposition rules. The intensive marginal effects imply that a one 
percent uniform increase in female non-farm income is expected to reduce the value of the 
Gini inequality index by 0.6% and the value of the squared coefficient of variation by 
0.16%. It should also be noted that men's non-farm labor income has negligible intensive 
marginal effects that are not statistically significant. The intensive marginal effects of 
remittances are positive but insignificant, while those of agricultural income are positive 
and negative under the Gini and squared coefficient of variation decomposition rules, 
respectively, and hence do not provide consistent information.  
The extensive marginal effects of non-farm labor income, men's or women's, are not 
statistically significant, while those of remittances are positive, but statistically significant 
only under the Gini decomposition rule. This implies that entry of households into non-
farm employment is not expected to have a significant effect on income inequality. The 
extensive marginal effects of agricultural income cannot be computed because all 
households in our sample derive income from agriculture. 
Since the intensive marginal effect of women's non-farm labor income is the only 
marginal effect that is both statistically significant and consistent in sign across the two   6
decomposition rules, we now differentiate this marginal effect by population sub-groups. In 
other words, instead of increasing female no-farm income uniformly across the sample, we 
do it for each population sub-group at a time. This can tell us whether certain population 
sub-groups are more likely than others to reduce income inequality be increasing their 
reliance on female non-farm income. We find that even after the differentiation, all 
intensive marginal effects of women's non-farm labor income are negative and statistically 
significant. We divide the sample into sub-groups according to marital status, family size, 
religion, household wealth, age and education. The results are in table 2. We find stronger 
effects on inequality among smaller households, among asset-poor households and among 
less-educated households. For example, the impact on inequality of increasing female non-
farm labor income by one percent among households with up to one child under the age of 
six, with up to three children up to the age of 17, or with up to three adults, is more than 
twice the impact on inequality of doing the same for larger households. This could be due 
to the fact that the population sub-groups with smaller family size are larger and have 
higher per-capita incomes, hence the one percent increase in female non-farm income is 
quantitatively stronger that a similar increase for the population sub-groups with larger 
family size. The same is true for households with no educated adults, which have lower 
per-capita income than households with educated adults, but are much larger in number, 
and for households with per-capita wealth below the sample mean, which have much lower 
per-capita income than households with per-capita income above the sample mean, and are 
larger in number. On the other hand, we find weaker intensive marginal effects of female 
non-farm income on inequality among minority groups of single-parent households and 
Muslim households. This could be due to the fact that these minority groups represent 
about 10% of the population only, so the aggregate increase in income implied by the 
intensive marginal effects are small relative to those of the majority groups. Altogether, we 
cannot draw a clear-cut conclusion that a uniform increase in women's non-farm labor 
income among disadvantaged households has a stronger or weaker effect on household 
income inequality than among other households, but we are confident that the intensive 
marginal effects are always negative and statistically significant. 
It should be noted that regression-based inequality decomposition techniques, 
suggested by Fields (2003) and by Morduch and Sicular (2002), are preferred for 
examining the impact of population characteristics on inequality. However, estimating the 
income-generating equations turned out to be highly unsatisfactory (in particular, 
household wealth explained almost all of the explained variation in per-capita income) in 
our case, and therefore we do not present these results. 
The robust result that a uniform increase in female non-farm labor income reduces 
total income inequality is probably due to the fact that female non-farm labor income 
accounts for a larger share of household income among low-income households. Hence, it 
identifies a suitable anti-poverty channel of policy intervention. The result that a uniform 
increase in female non-farm labor income has a stronger negative impact on inequality 
among non-educated households can be explained by the fact that uneducated adults are 
less likely to find satisfactory employment in the labor market, and therefore they are more 
likely to engage in self employment, which is heavily concentrated among females in our 
sample (figure 1). Altogether, these households have lower per-capita income but their 
income is more sensitive to changes in female non-farm labor income. 
 
Conclusion 
    This article deals with the importance of non-farm income to per-capita income 
inequality among Ensete-growing households in southern Ethiopia, with an emphasis on   7
the gender dimension. The gender dimension is important in this context because we found 
gender-specific patterns of engagement in non-farm income-generating activities, with 
males more likely to engage in wage labor while females more likely to engage in self-
employment. This could be because self-employment activities are more flexible in term of 
timing and hence are better complements to household tasks that are traditionally carried 
out by females. Men are more likely to be educated, a fact which also contributes to the 
comparative advantage of males in wage labor. 
We found that female non-farm labor incom e  i s  t h e  o n l y  i n c o m e  s o u r c e  t h a t  
significantly reduces per-capita income inequality. More precisely, a uniform increase in 
female non-farm labor income, among households that already have income from this 
source, reduces inequality. This finding has a clear policy implication: encouraging women 
to devote more time to non-farm income-generating activities, and creating market 
mechanisms that increase earnings in these activities, could potentially lift households out 
of poverty and at the same time reduce income inequality as a whole. Moreover, our results 
show that this conclusion is robust for non-uniform percentage increases in women's non-
farm labor income as well. In particular, we still obtained negative and statistically 
significant effects on inequality when we simulated the percentage increase in female non-
farm labor income for particular population sub-groups, although the effects varied in 
magnitude across the population sub-groups. 
Self-employment activities by women in a subsistence economy such as southern 
Ethiopia serve as a default source of extra income, due to the thin labor market and the 
comparative advantage of males in the labor market. This is why increasing the 
opportunities for women to engage in self employment activities is likely to have a larger 
impact on disadvantaged households and therefore reduce inequality. This conclusion 
comes with a caveat: our simulations held all other income sources constant while 
increasing female non-farm labor income. In fact, it could be that better non-farm earning 
opportunities will draw women out of other income-generating activities such as 
agricultural production. This calls for an extension of this research in the direction of 
deriving counterfactual income distributions for hypothetical changes in female non-farm 
labor opportunities, which take into account resulting changes in other income sources. 
In order to maximize the favorable inequality outcomes of policy measures that 
increase female non-farm labor income, authorities should target specific population 
groups, in particular asset-poor households and less-educated households, which were 
found to have quantitatively stronger effects on inequality, when applying such policies. 
Note that the inequality implications could be even stronger if the outcome of the policy 
also decreases the variability of female non-farm labor income in the population. In such a 
case, the positive proportional contribution of female non-farm labor income to inequality 
and its negative intensive marginal effects work in the same direction, namely to reduce 
per-capita income inequality. One of the policies that could be useful in this regard is 
female educational enhancements. This could open more opportunities for women in the 
hired labor market, improve women's position within the household, and promote overall 
income inequality as well as gender equality. 
Our conclusions could be generalized to other subsistence economies with thin 
labor markets and gender differences in labor market qualifications. It is not clear to what 
extent they also apply in other situations. In both cases, there is room for further research 
into this issue using data sets from other parts of Ethiopia as well as from other countries in 
Africa and elsewhere. 
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Appendix: simulating the extensive marginal effects 
Increasing the number of households who have positive income from source k by one 
percent is equivalent to increasing total income of households who have positive income 
from source k by one percent. In addition, the income of households who have zero income 
from source k can be decreased by a certain percentage that is equivalent to the percentage by 
which the number of households who have zero income from source k has to be decreased so 
as to keep the total number of households constant. The effect of these changes on income 
inequality is denoted here as the extensive marginal effects. 
Specifically, the extensive marginal effects are computed in the following way. First, 
we partition the inequality index (1) into two portions related to two subsamples, those who 
have income from a particular source (+) and those who do not (-): 
  
(A.1)  I(y) = Σi+ai(y)yi + Σi-ai(y)yi 
 
Then, we simulate a shift of one percent of households from the (-) subsample to the (+) 
subsample, assuming that once a household moves from (-) to (+), its per-capita income also 
changes by the same percentage in which the mean income of (+) is larger than the mean 
income of (-). This means that a household with an average income in the (-) subsample gets 
the mean income of the (+) subsample. Technically, the simulated level of inequality is  
 
(A.2)  I*(y) = I(y) + 0.01Σi+ai(y)yi - xΣi-ai(y)yi, 
 
where  x = 0.01Σi+yi / Σi-yi. The purpose of x is to keep the total number of households 





























Figure 2. Sources of per-capita income 
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Table 1. Inequality decomposition by income source 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
    Inequality measures 




income   Gini  Squared CV 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Inequality index    0.5306 1.5535 
      
Proportional contributions      
















Total 100%  1.00  1.00 
Intensive marginal effects      
















Extensive marginal effects 
    













Note: bootstrapped t-statistics in parentheses. 
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Table 2. Marginal effects of female non-farm income by population sub-groups 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 












Marital status of household head        








Number of children up to 6        








Number of children 7-17        








Number of adults        








Religion        








Household wealth        










Continued on next page 
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Table 2 (continued)        
____________________________________________________________________ 
 












Age of household head        








Educated adult in the household        








        






Note: bootstrapped t-statistics in parentheses. 
 
 